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Abstract
Preliminary evidence indicates that pollution increases severity and likelihood of Covid-19
infections as is the case for many other infectious diseases. This paper models the interaction
of pollution and preventive actions on transmission of infectious diseases in a neoclassical
growth framework where households do not take into account how their actions affects disease
transmission and production activity results in pollution which increases likelihood of infec-
tions. Household can take private actions for abatement of pollution as for controlling disease
transmission. Disease dynamics follow SIS dynamics. We study the difference in health and
economic outcomes between the decentralized economy, where households do not internalize
the externalities, and the socially optimal outcomes, and characterize the taxes and subsidies
that will decentralize the socially optimal outcomes. Thus, we examine the question whether
there are sufficient incentives to reduce pollution, both at the private and public levels, once its
effects on disease transmission is taken into account.
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1 Introduction
Preliminary evidence from China, Italy, USA and other countries has shown that the presence of
pollution, PM (particulate matter), NOx (nitrogen oxides) and ground level ozone increases the
severity and likelihood of Covid-19 infections (Conticini, et al. (2020), Martelleti and Martelleti
(2020), Wu, et al. (2020), Yongjian, et al. (2020). Some studies also suggest that higher pollution
increases aerosol transmission (Setti, et al. (2020), Qin, et al. (2020)). These pollutants are also
known to increase other infections especially acute lower respiratory infections including pneumo-
nia, bronchitis, and influenza (Cienciwicki and Jaspers (2007), Horne, et al. (2018), Huang, et al.
(2016), Kampa and Castanas (2008), Kelly and Fussell (2011), Lian, et al. (2014), Mehta, et al.
(2013), Tasci, et al. (2018)).1 Thus, to control Covid-19 or other infectious diseases there are two
mechanisms - preventive health expenditures which prevent infections and a pollution abatement
policy which by reducing pollution reduces disease transmission. The Covid epidemic has raised
expectations of a “Green recovery” where the understanding the role of pollution will increase the
impetus for less polluting technologies. This paper adds to the thinking of how likely is it that
pollution abatement will result once the additional channel of pollution affecting transmission of
Covid-19 and other infectious diseases is taken into account.
This paper studies the interaction of these two instruments in a dynamic general equilibrium
analysis by extending the economic epidemiological model of Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014)
and Goenka and Liu (2019) to model the interaction of pollution with health where the disease
dynamics are of SIS type used to model Covid-19. Pollution is modeled as a flow (consistent
with evidence on PM and NOx ((Varotsos et al. (2005), Windsor and Toumi (2001), Zeka et al.
(2005))) which increases with productive activity. The contact rate in the SIS model2 is increased
by pollution and decreased by preventive health expenditures. The health investment is chosen to
maximize discounted welfare along with current consumption and investment in physical capital.
Thus, the interaction between pollution and health is endogenized and depends on optimal deci-
sions. In the model, there are two externalities. One is the pollution externality where the pollution
resulting from production increases disease transmission. The second is the disease externality,
i.e. a household in deciding its optimal plans does not take into account the effect of their dec-
sions on the evolution of the infectious disease (see Geoffard and Philipson (1996), Gersovitz and
Hammer (2004), and Goenka and Liu (2019) for modeling of disease externalities). We study the
decentralized dynamic equilibrium and contrast it with the social planner’s efficient outcome that
internalizes both these externalities.
We show that there can be two steady states: a disease free steady state (which is essentially
the neoclassical steady state) and a disease endemic steady state if in equilibrium, the disease is
infective enough. As the model is complex to solve analytically we study to what extent the out-
comes are affected by the externalities through numerically analyzing the model. Since there is
insufficient information so far to calibrate the effect of diseases and preventive health expenditures
on disease evolution we fix the other parameters and vary the elasticity of pollution on the contact
rate, the elasticity of pollution abatement and the TFP to get a sense of the qualitative properties
of the model. We also characterize the dynamic Pigovian taxes that will decentralize the efficient
1Pollution also increases incidence non-communicable diseases such as asthma, COPD, and other respiratory dis-
eases as well cardiovascular diseasese. See Goenka, et al. (2020) for dynamic models studying nexus of pollution and
non-communicable diseases but this is not the focus of this paper.
2This modeling choice is discussed in detail in the following section
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outcomes. Analogous to the first set of numerical exercises we study how the taxes will change
as we vary the two elasticities and the TFP. Several interesting results emerge. First, even if there
are two externalities, two instruments are insufficient to decentralize the efficient outcome since
pollution affects the economy through multiple channels. Second, the subsidy on health expendi-
ture and pollution abatement are the same even though their effects on disease transmission need
not be. The intuition is that in equilibrium, the marginal benefit of pollution abatement and health
expenditure are equal as they both effect the economy only through the effect on the contact rate.
Third, in the efficient outcome even if there is more abatement and health expenditures and bet-
ter health outcomes, pollution is higher than in the decentralized. While there is more abatement
undertaken the effect of the higher output - due to increased labor supply and output mainly due
to higher labor - dominates. Thus, there is no “disease dividend” from controlling the disease
in controlling pollution. This is consistent with the evidence that emission levels have gone up
and even exceeded pre-lockdown levels in many regions that have controlled Covid infections (see
Myllyvirta (2020) for study of emissions in China). Fourth, countries with higher TFP will have
higher pollution as the incentive to tax capital reduces. Thus, faster growing economies will have
lower incentive to control pollution. The last two implications are consistent with the evidence
that the Green Recovery that was hoped after the Covid outbreak may be evanescent (see Harvey
(2020)).
The papers most close to this paper are Bosi and Desmarchelier (2018, 2019) and Goenka and
Liu (2020). These papers use SIS dynamics in a growth model and model the disease externality.
While Bosi and Desmarchelier (2018) has pollution affecting disease transmission directly as the
current paper, Goenka and Liu (2019) have health capital (as does Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014))
and a negative effect of capital stock which can be interpreted as pollution. Bosi and Desmarchelier
(2018) treat pollution as a pure externality, while the Goenka and Liu (2020) also considers health
interventions. Bosi and Desmarchelier (2019) extend their earlier paper by making utility depend
on pollution and by considering abatement of pollution which is modeled as a stock rather than
flow. This paper studies the effect of both pollution and health and includes health responses as
well as abatement activity.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model, Section 3 analyzes the
decentralized equilibria, Section 4 the centralized equilibria where the social planner internalizes
the externalities, Section 5 does the numerical analysis of the steady state equilibria, Section 6 the
dynamic Pigovian taxes which decentralize the planning outcomes, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Epidemiology We use the SIS model to study the spread of the disease. While this was the most
common modeling choice to model Covid-19 (see Ferguson (2020) it is not well understood for
how long is disease related immunity conferred for coronaviruses such as Covid-19. The evidence
is preliminary, but there is emerging evidence that subsequent immunity may not be long lasting.
Long, et al. (2020) using data from China find evidence consistent with steep decline in 2-3
months. Similar results were found in Ibarrando, et al. (2020), Isho, et al. (2020), Riperger, et al.
(2020), Ward, et al. (2020). On the other hand Wajnberg, et al. (2020) and Sekine, et al. (2020)
find evidence suggesting longer immunity. As a modeling stategy Kissler, et al. (2020) use an
SIRS model for medium run projections. As we are concerned about the medium to longer run in
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this paper we abstract from the temporary immunity phase (i.e. the state R).3. The population (Nt)
is divided in two classes: susceptible, healthy and who can catch the disease (St) and infective,
those infected and capable of transmitting the disease (It). with St + It = Nt .
dSt/dt = bNt−dSt−αStIt/Nt
dIt/dt = αStIt/Nt− γIt−dIt
St , It ,Nt ≥ 0,∀t;
S0, I0,N0 > 0 with N0 = S0 + I0,
where b is the exogenous birth rate, d is exogenous death rate, we assume that d ≤ b. One of
the features of Covid-19 is disease related mortality. The case fatality rate (CFR) is estimated to
be around 1.4%, i.e. the percentage of the individuals who are known to be infected die from
the disease. This has deep implications for thinking about the control of Covid-19. Our paper
studies the trade-offs between controlling pollution and disease prevention and in this we abstract
from it. See Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2020a) on modeling mortality in a SIS model without
pollution.4 The key epidemiology variables are the contact rate, α , i.e. the average number of
adequate contacts of a person to catch the disease per unit time and γ , the recovery rate from
the disease. In this paper we endogenize α by making it depend on health expenditures and on
pollution. We treat γ as exogenous to keep the model tractable. Antivirals and anti-inflammatory
drugs are now known to reduce severity of the Covid illness but these are inexpensive and widely
available prior to the outbreak. Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) endogenize the recovery rate in a
model without pollution.
The proportions of susceptible and infective is given by st = StNt , it =
It
Nt
. The population growth
rate is given by
dNt/dt = (b−d)Nt , b≥ 0, d ≥ 0, b−d ≥ 0.
We assume b−d ≥ 0 so that the population is not declining. As s+ i = 1 and ṡ+ i̇ = 0 we can
describe the epidemiology dynamics by the following equation, the law of motion of the infectives:
i̇ = αi(1− i)− (b+ γ)i.
There are two steady states in the pure-epidemiology model, the disease free steady state
(s∗, i∗) = (1,0)










3This is also consistent with many of the other infectious diseases that are the main sources of disease related
mortality, in particular malaria, tuberculosis, dengue, and influenza also do not have disease related immunity. While
an individual may have immunity to a particular strain of influenza for a short period, the virus mutates and there is no
lasting immunity. HIV/AIDS is a disease of SI class and its epidemiology is not captured by either SIS or SIR models.
4Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2020b) model the effect of disease mortality in a SIR model.
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The disease free steady state always exists, and the disease endemic steady state exists only if
α > (b+ γ). If this inequality is satisfied, then the disease free steady state is unstable and the
disease free steady state is stable, otherwise the disease free steady state is stable. There is a






There are many perfectly competitive firms that maximize profit by choosing physical capital,
k, and labor, l, as inputs taking the real interest rate, R, and the wage rate, W , as given. The
assumptions on the production function, f (k,L) are standard and as follows.
Assumption 1. The production function f (k, l) : R2+ → R+ is C 2, homogeneous of degree one,
and
1. f1 > 0, f11 < 0, f2 > 0, f22 < 0,
2. limkt→0 f1 = ∞, limkt→∞ f1 = 0 and f (0, l) = f (k,0) = 0.
Profit maximization implies the following marginal conditions:
R = f1(k,1− i) (1)
W = f2(k,1− i)
Production also results in a flow of pollution. By pollution we mean primarily PM and NOx
which have been shown to affect transmission of Covid-19 (Conticini, et al. (2020), Martelleti
and Martelleti (2020), Setti, et al. (2020), Qin, et al. (2020), Wu, et al. (2020), and Yongjian,
et al. (2020)) and increase other infections such as acute lower respiratory infections including
pneumonia, bronchitis and influenza (Cienciwicki and Jaspers (2007), Horne, et al. (2018), Huang,
et al. (2016), Kampa and Castanas (2008), Kelly and Fussell (2011), Lian, et al. (2014), Mehta,
et al. (2013), Tasci, et al. (2018)). We treat this as a flow, i.e. it does not accumulate, as evidence
suggests that it does not accumulate (Varotsos et al. (2005), Windsor and Toumi (2001), Zeka et al.
(2005)). In the decentralized economy, this is treated as an externality. The evolution of pollution
is given below.
Assumption 2. The level of pollution is a function of output y and abatement q - that is, P(y,q)
where P : R2+→ R+ is C 2. We assume
• P1(y,q)> 0 and P2(y,q)< 0.
In the paper we will model both the private choice of abatement as well as the optimal amount
of abatement. In the decentralized economy, the pollution level is given as:
P = P(Ȳ ,q) = P( f (k,1− i),q), (2)
where the Ȳ denotes that the output is taken as given so that pollution is an externality.
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Labor supply: We assume that the labor force (l) consists of healthy people: l = s . Then l inherits
the dynamics of l = 1− i.5 We are assuming for simplicity that all infected workers do not work
(see Goenka and Liu (2020) and Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2020a) for further discussion of this
assumption).
Economic epidemiology model
In this paper we endogenize the contact rate, α . As there are no special therapies for treat-
ment of Covid-19 other than available therapies that reduce severity of the infection, we treat γ
as exogenous.6 The contact rate depends on preventive health expenditure h and pollution P. In
this paper we are treating health expenditures as only a flow of expenditures that does not accu-
mulate as opposed to a stock of capital. This is consistent with the modeling in Eichenbaum, et
al. (2020) where NPIs that reduce infections act as a tax on consumption - what we label as health
expenditures or infection preventing acitivities.7 Thus, the contact rate is the function α(h,P).
Assumption 3. The contact rate function: α(h,P) : R+→ R+ is a C 2 function with
• α1(h,P)< 0 and α2(h,P)> 0.
Thus, in the model the only role of pollution is to increase the contact rate. Pollution, indeed,
has other affects in the economy: it can create production and consumption externalities, and in-
crease the non-infectious mortality rate. We abstract from these effects as these have been modeled
in dynamic general equilibrium models and we want to concentrate on the interaction of pollution,
infectious disease transmission and preventive health measures.8
Households: We assume the economy is populated by a continuum of non-atomic identical house-
holds who are the representative decision-making agents. The size of the population in each house-
hold grows over time at the rate of b−d ≥ 0, where b is the birth rate and d is the death rate. We
treat the demographic parameters, b and d, as exogenous and abstract from the fertility-mortality
nexus. Within each household, an individual is either susceptible (healthy and not yet infected by
the disease) or infective (infected and capable of transmitting it to others).
Each household is assumed to be sufficiently large so that the proportion of the household
in each disease status is identical to the corresponding population proportion. Thus, within a
household, the proportion of healthy individuals is s, proportion of infected individuals is i, and
proportion of recovered individuals is r. Each household understands and anticipates how the
disease evolves and is fully forward-looking with regard to its possible future states as well as
its present situation. However, following Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) the household considers
itself small relative to the population and believes that the disease status within the household does
5We take labor supply by the healthy workers as inelastic. If labor supply is elastic then under standard assumption
of preferences u(c, l) > 0 the qualitative features of the model are not affected. (see Goenka and Liu (2013) for a
SIS model with elastic labor supply. If we drop this assumption then labor supply can be an independent source of
non-linear dynamics and cycles.
6In Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) we modelled γ as a function of h.
7Bosi and Desmarchellier (2018) have α(P), Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) model this as α(h), Goenka and Liu
(2019) have α(h,k,e) where k, h, e are stocks of physical, health and human capital in an endogenous growth model.
8Goenka, Jafarey, and Pouliot (2020) study optimal policies when pollution increases mortality through non-
communicable diseases.
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not affect the proportion of infectives in the entire population. In particular, the household takes
as given the proportion of the population that is infected, denoted as Π, and thinks the probability
for the healthy individuals to contract disease is αΠ, rather than αi. As a result, the disease
transmission dynamics perceived by the households is now given as follows:
i̇ = α(h,P(Ȳ ,q))Π(1− i)− γi−bi. (3)
This captures the idea that the household is small relative to the population and does not take into
account the externality on disease transmission. It is competitive “disease taking” looking only at
private benefits/costs and not social benefits/costs. This distinguishes the competitive model from
the social optimum where this externality is taken into account. Furthermore, the household taking
the level of output as given, Ȳ chooses the amount of private abatement.
There is a two-way interaction between the economy and the disease. On the one hand, dis-
eases have direct adverse effects on the economy by reducing the labor force participation. Being
infected with a disease affects the productivity of an individual. As make the simplifying assump-
tion that an infected individual is incapacitated by the disease or that the productivity falls to zero,
For each household labor supply L is given by the proportion of the healthy individuals, i.e. L = S
and dynamics inherits the dynamics of (1− i).








where ρ is the discount factor with ρ > b− d, and the initial size of household is assumed to be
one. The assumptions on the felicity function are given below. We further assume there is full
insurance within each household and all individuals have the same consumption irrespective of
their health status. This is indeed optimal, if the household welfare aggregator is concave.
Assumption 4. The household’s felicity function, u : R++→ R is C 2 with uc > 0 and ucc < 0,
jointly with the limit conditions: limc→0+ uc = ∞ and limc→+∞ uc = 0.
Households take the interest rate R and wage W as given, rent out physical capital K and choose
how much to consume, c, how much to invest in capital, v, spend in disease prevention activities,
h, and in pollution abatement, q. Thus, the budget constraint is:
C+ v+h+q = Rk+Wl. (5)
The evolution of the capital stock is given by:
k̇ = v+δk− k(b−d) (6)
(7)
where δk ∈ (0,1] is the depreciation rates of physical capital.
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The equation (6) can be written as
k̇ = Rk+Wl− c−h−q−δk− k(b−d)
Given Π,Ȳ ,R,W the representative household maximizes the intertemporal utility. Therefore,







k̇ = Rk+W (1− i)− c−h−q−δk− (b−d)k
i̇ = α(h,P(Ȳ ,q))Π(1− i)− γi−bi
The control variables are c,h,q, the state variables are k, i.
3 Decentralized economy
We define the competitive equilibrium in the decentralized economy. It is a standard definition
with the condition that the perceived proportion of infected by households, Π is equal to the actual
proportion of infected in the population, i, and Ȳ = Y .
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation {c,k,h,q, i} and given {Π,Ȳ ,R,W}
1. Households solve the maximization problem (8).
2. Firms maximize profits, given by equation (1).
3. The capital market, labor market and goods market clear.
4. Pollution satisfies (2) with Ȳ = f (k,1− i).
5. Since each household is representative of the population, in equilibrium, Π = i.
We now characterize the dynamical system that defines the dynamic general equilibrium of the
economy.
The current value Lagrangian for the optimization household problem is:
L = u(c)+λ1[Rk+W (1− i)− c−h−q−δk− (b−d)k]+λ2[α(h,P(Ȳ ,q))Π(1− i)− γi−bi]
+µ1i+µ2h
Incorporating the equilibrium conditions
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R = f1(k,1− i)
W = f2(k,1− i)
P = P(Ȳ ,q) = P( f (k,1− i),q)
Π = i
we can write the conditions for an equilibrium in the economy.
The equilibrium in the decentralized economy is determined by the following equations (the
first order conditions and the transversality conditions to the household problem incorporating the
equilibrium conditions):
k̇ = f (k,1− i)− c−h−q−δk− (b−d)k (9)
i̇ = α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i)− γi−bi (10)
u′(c) = λ1 (11)
λ1 = λ2α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i) (12)
λ1 = λ2α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P2( f (k,1− i),q)i(1− i) (13)
λ̇1 = λ1[ρ +δ +b−d− f1(k,1− i)] (14)
λ̇2 = ρλ2 +λ1 f2(k,1− i)+λ2[α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i+ γ +b] (15)
µ1 ≥ 0, i≥ 0, µ1i = 0,
µ2 ≥ 0, h≥ 0, µ2h = 0,
lim
t→∞
e−θ tλ1k = limt→∞ e
−θ t
λ2i = 0.
As the economy is a neo-classical economy with a bounded capital stock and i lies in a bounded
interval, the transversality conditions are satisfied, and in the subsequent discussion we suppress
these.
Note that the optimization problem has non-convex constraints on the state variable i and the
usual Arrow and Mangasarian condition do not apply. Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) have
however, shown existence and sufficiency for the SIS model and we concentrate on studying the
first order conditions which will characterize the dynamical system of the economy.9
3.1 Steady states
We know characterize the steady state competitive equilibria for the decentralized economy. As
in the pure epidemiology model there are two equilibria which depend on the basic reproduction
number, i.e. determined by the contact rate. However, unlike the pure epidemiology model it is
endogenous depending on the abatement and disease preventive activities.
Proposition 1. There always exists a unique disease free steady state with i∗ = 0, h∗ = 0 and
9The sufficiency conditions have been extended to account for mortality in Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2020a) and
for the SIR model with mortality in Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2020b).
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q∗ = 0. The economic variables k∗ and c∗ are determined by
f1(k,1) = ρ +δ +b−d
f (k,1) = c+δk+(b−d)k.
In the disease free steady state pollution plays no role in role the determination of equilibrium,
and the economy is in the neoclassical steady state. In the disease free steady state, there is no
abatement as the only effect of pollution in this model is on disease transmission. As there is no
disease prevalence, there is also no health preventive expenditure. Let us call this ᾱ . If ᾱ < b+ γ
the disease is eradicated and the steady state is locally stable, and if ᾱ . If ᾱ > b+ γ the disease
free steady state is unstable.
The disease endemic steady state is a solution to the system of equations (9 - 15). It will exist
if when the contact rate is high enough so that s∗ < 1, i.e. α(h∗,P∗) > b+ γ or the equilibrium
endogenous contact rate R∗0 > 1.
Proposition 2. There exists a disease endemic steady state where i∗,k∗,h∗,q∗ and c∗ are deter-
mined by:
i = 1− b+ γ
α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))
(16)
α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q)) = α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P2( f (k,1− i),q) (17)
f1(k,1− i) = ρ +δ +b−d (18)
− f2(k,1− i)α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i) = ρ +α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q)) (19)
f (k,1− i) = c+h+q+δk+(b−d)k (20)
Proof. From equation (10) i̇ = 0, we have either i∗ = 0 or i∗ = 1− b+γ
α(h,P) . Note that this implies
α(h,P)i = α(h,P)− (b+ γ).
From equation (12) and (13), we have
α1(h,P) = α2(h,P)P2(y,q).
In equilibrium the marginal benefit of health expenditure h should be the same as the marginal
benefit of pollution abatement q as both health expenditure and pollution abatement only affect the
economy through their impact on the contact rate α .
From λ̇1 = 0, we have
f1(k,1− i) = ρ +δ +b−d,
which is the standard marginal benefit of physical capital equals to its marginal cost.
From λ̇2 = 0, we have
λ1 f2(k,1− i) =−λ2ρ−λ2[α(h,P)i+ γ +b],
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which implies the marginal benefit of disease controlling (one unit of reduction in i - the proportion
of the infected) equals to its marginal cost. The L.H.S of the above equation is the marginal benefit,
as with one unit of reduction in the proportion of the infected i, the labor force increases by one
unit and generates the marginal product f2(k,1− i). The R.H.S is the marginal cost of disease
controlling. Note that the shadow value of the infected - λ2 is negative. When there is one unit of
reduction in the proportion of the infected, the proportion of the susceptible increases by one unit.
As there are more susceptible around, there are more infections.
Then, we substitute into equation (12), and we have
− f2(k,1− i)α1(h,P)i(1− i) = ρ +α(h,P).
Note, that in equilibrium from (16) we have R∗0 > 1. Thus, in the competitive equilibrium
the disease is endemic. Whether this is the case depends on not only the disease characteristics,
i.e. the function α , but also the deeper economic parameters which determine whether it is in the
interest of the households to take sufficient actions to bring the contact rate below the threshold.
There is a tension on what will happen once the contact rate drops below 1, whether the economy
will converge to a disease free steady state. It depends on whether the disease free steady state is
stable or not and depends on the bifurcation when the contact rate is 1. In this paper, we focus on
the difference between the private and public actions and do not investigate this issue in further
depth. The paper Goenka and Liu (2013) and Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) study these issues
in further depth in a model without pollution in discrete time and continuous time respectively.
4 The Centralised Economy
In the centralized economy, the social planner takes into account both pollution externalities and
disease externalities, i.e. the true law of motion for the disease and affect of output on pollution









k̇ = f (k,1− i)− c−h−q−δk− (b−d)k
i̇ = α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i)− γi−bi
The equilibrium in the centralized economy is determined by the following equations (sup-
pressing the transversality conditions):
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k̇ = f (k,1− i)− c−h−q−δk− (b−d)k (21)
i̇ = α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i)− γi−bi (22)
u′(c) = λ1 (23)
λ1 = λ2α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i) (24)
λ1 = λ2α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P2( f (k,1− i),q)i(1− i) (25)
λ̇1 = λ1[ρ +δ +b−d− f1(k,1− i)]+ [−λ2α2(h,P)P1(y,q) f1(k,1− i)(1− i)i] (26)
λ̇2 = ρλ2 +λ1 f2(k,1− i)+λ2[α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i+ γ +b]+
+[λ2α2(h,P)P1(y,q) f2(k,1− i)(1− i)i]+ [−λ2α(h,P)(1− i)] (27)
Note that there is an additional term in (26) as compared to (14) in the decentralized economy
which arises from taking the effect of output on pollution and hence, disease transmission; and
two additional terms in (27) as compared to (15) that arise from taking into account the effects of
infections on labor supply, and hence output, pollution and disease transmission and the second
which internalizes the disease externality.
4.1 Steady states
There always exists a unique disease free steady state with i∗ = 0, h∗ = 0 and q∗ = 0. This is
exactly the same as the one in decentralized economy as it is the neoclassical steady state with
h∗ = q∗ = 0.
As in the decentralized economy there is also a disease endemic steady state.
Proposition 3. There exists a disease endemic steady state where i∗,k∗,h∗,q∗ and c∗ are deter-
mined by:
i = 1− b+ γ
α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))
(28)
α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q)) = α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P2( f (k,1− i),q) (29)
f1(k,1− i) = ρ +δ +b−d +[−
P1( f (k,1− i),q) f1(k,1− i)
P2( f (k,1− i),q)
] (30)
− f2(k,1− i)α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i)+ [α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))(1− i)] = (31)
= ρ +α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))+ [α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P1( f (k,1− i),q) f2(k,1− i)(1− i)i]
f (k,1− i) = c+h+q+δk+(b−d)k (32)
Proof. The proof is the similar as the one in decentralized economy and thus omitted here.
Compared with the decentralized economy, there are two differences. One difference is equa-
tion (30), which says the marginal social benefit of physical capital should equal to the marginal
social cost. In the centralized economy, the social planner takes into account the negative exter-
nality of pollution on disease transmission, and thus there is an additional cost to physical capital
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investment. When physical capital increases, output increases, which leads to more pollution and
higher contact rate for disease transmission. This is captured by the term [−P1( f (k,1−i),q) f1(k,1−i)P2( f (k,1−i),q) ].
The other difference is equation (31), which says the marginal social benefit of disease controlling
equals to the marginal social cost. In the centralized economy, there are two additional terms in
equation (31). When the social planner takes into account the negative externality of pollution
there is additional cost of an increase in labor input or reduction in the proportion of the infected.
When the proportion of the infected decreases, the proportion of the susceptible or the labor force
increases, which leads to more output and pollution, and then higher contact rate for disease trans-
mission. This is captured by the term [α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P1( f (k,1− i),q) f2(k,1− i)(1− i)i].
Moreover, the social planner takes into account the disease externality. That is, there is additional
benefit from controlling disease, as the social planner further takes into account the behavior is go-
ing to affect the proportion of the infected. This is captured by the term α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))(1−
i). Thus, compared with the decentralized economy, the centralized economy takes into account
both negative pollution externalities and positive disease controlling externality. To compare the
abatement and health expenditures in the centralized and decentralized economies we have to use
numerical methods as the system of non-linear equations are too complex to compare directly.
5 Model Simulations
As the model is too complex for closed form solutions or doing comparative statics analytically,
in this section, we calibrate the model and do comparative statics numerically to understand the
interaction of the different components. We focus on examining the parameters where pollution
can affect the disease transmission. That is, we vary the elasticity of pollution on the disease
contact rate, the elasticity of pollution abatement, and the productivity in the economy. The last is
important as it tries to ascertain whether more productive economies will have different responses
and outcomes. The analysis here focuses on the equilibrium steady states before and after the
change as we want to capture the medium to longer term effects when investment and returns to
labor and capital have adjusted.
The following functional forms and parameters are chosen in line with the literature. The
production function is assumed to be Cobb Douglas: y = f (k,1− i) = Akβ (1− i)1−β with A = 1
and β = 0.36. Physical capital depreciates at the rate δ = 0.05 and discount rate ρ = 0.055. The
utility function is of the CES form U(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ and we choose σ = 1, that is, the utility function
is log utility. We set the birth rate b = 3% and death rate d = 1.5%. The recovery rate is γ = 0.2.
We do not have enough empirical evidence in suggesting for functional form for contact rate
function α(h,P) and pollution function P(y,q). Therefore, the contact rate function is chosen in
line with the assumption on α(h,P) and large enough to generate an endemic steady state in the
simulation. We assume contact rate function is a power function: α(h) = ε0(h+ ε1)ε2(P+ ε3)ε4
with ε0 = 0.2,ε1 = 0,ε2 = −0.2,ε3 = 0 and ε4 = 0.2 in the baseline specification. The pollution
function is also chosen in line with the assumptions. We assume P(y,q) = φ0 f (k,1− i)−φ1(q+
φ2)
φ3 with φ0 = 1,φ1 = 1,φ2 = 0 and φ3 = 0.5 in the baseline specification.
Figure 1, 2 and 3 are the simulation results for varying the elasticity of pollution on contact rate
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Figure 1. The simulation results - varying the elasticity of pollution on contact rate
Note: The figure shows changes in the disease endemic steady state when we change the elasticity of pollution
on contact rate. There are total 8 panels - I (the proportion of the infected), K (physical capital), H (health
expenditure), Y (output), C (consumption), α (contact rate), P (pollution), q (abatement). The solid line is the
decentralized economy (without disease externality and without pollution externality). The dashed line is the
centralized economy (with disease externality and pollution externality).
function (ε4), the elasticity of abatement on pollution (φ3) and the productivity (A), respectively.
The parameters are chosen such that disease endemic steady states exist for both the decentralized
and centralized economy. So we can focus on how changes in those parameters change economic
variables. The solid line is the decentralized economy (where the disease and pollution external-
ities have not been internalized). The dashed line is the centralized economy (where the disease
externality and pollution externalities have been internalized). Across all the three figures, if we
compare the decentralized economy with the centralized economy, the pictures are very similar.
The social planner when taking the externalities into account is able to achieve lower contact rates
in equilibrium with higer health expenditures. As a result, the labor force is larger and output
higher. The capital stock is lower in the planning solution. While the abatement is higher in the
planning solution, paradoxically pollution is also higher. This is being driven by the fact that in the
planning solution, the output is higher and even thought there is greater abatement, the net effect
of the higher output dominates and pollution is higher. Thus, even when the planner takes into
account the deleterious effect of pollution on health outcomes, the efficient outcome has higher
pollution. If an economy has higher TFP or not does not change the qualitative effects, except that
a more productive economy will have better economic outcomes as well as higher pollution. The
health outcomes and the abatement is not affected by a change in TFP.
In the pure epidemiology model, disease free steady state always exists, and disease endemic
steady state only exists when contact rate is high enough, that is, α > b+ γ or R0 = αb+γ > 1.
When there is only one disease free steady state, it is stable. When both disease free and disease
endemic steady states co-exist, disease free steady state is unstable and disease endemic steady
state is stable. The same applies to the economic epidemiological models here for both decen-
tralized economy and centralized economy. The only difference is that the contact rate α or R0
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Figure 2. The simulation results - varying the elasticity of abatement on pollution
Note: The figure shows changes in the disease endemic steady state when we change the elasticity of abate-
ment on pollution. There are total 8 panels - I (the proportion of the infected), K (physical capital), H (health
expenditure), Y (output), C (consumption), α (contact rate), P (pollution), q (abatement). The solid line is the
decentralized economy (without disease externality and without pollution externality). The dashed line is the
centralized economy (with disease externality and pollution externality).
Figure 3. The simulation results - varying productivity
Note: The figure shows changes in the disease endemic steady state when we change productivity in the pro-
duction function. There are total 8 panels - I (the proportion of the infected), K (physical capital), H (health
expenditure), Y (output), C (consumption), α (contact rate), P (pollution), q (abatement). The solid line is the
decentralized economy (without disease externality and without pollution externality). The dashed line is the
centralized economy (with disease externality and pollution externality).
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Figure 4. The simulation results - disease free and disease endemic steady states
Note: The figure shows changes in the disease free and disease endemic steady states when we change the
contact rate parameter ε0. There are total 8 panels - I (the proportion of the infected), K (physical capital), H
(health expenditure), Y (output), C (consumption), α (contact rate), P (pollution), q (abatement). The solid line
is the decentralized economy (without disease externality and without pollution externality). The dashed line is
the centralized economy (with disease externality and pollution externality).
is endogenous, and thus the cut-off points of the contact rate for the existence of disease endemic
steady state are different in the decentralized and centralized economies. Since the social planner
takes the externalities into account, and is able to achieve lower contact rates in equilibrium, with
the same parameter values it is more likely to have disease eradicated in the centralized economy.
That is, the cut-off point of the contact rate parameter for the existence of disease endemic steady
state in the centralized economy is higher than the one in the decentralized economy. To show this,
we have chosen the recovery rate γ = 0.5 such that when we vary the contact rate parameter ε0 from
0.01 to 0.3, there are changes in steady states in both decentralized and centralized economy. The
simulation results is shown in Figure 4. We can see that the cut-off points to have disease endemic
steady state is ε0 = 0.08 for the decentralized economy and ε0 = 0.12 for the centralized economy.
When the contact rate parameter ε0 is small enough (below 0.08) such that α < b+ γ , we can see
there is disease free steady state in both decentralized and centralized economy, The proportion of
the infected is zero and all variables are the same in both economies. When ε0 is between 0.08
and 0.12, that is, the contact rate rises, in the centralized economy, as α < b+ γ there is only one
disease free steady state, and disease endemic steady state does not exist. In contrast, in the de-
centralized economy, disease endemic steady state exists.10 For the disease endemic steady state
in the decentralized economy, the fraction of the infected is positive and physical capital, output
and consumption are lower, compared with the centralized economy. When ε0 is above 0.12, for
both decentralized and centralized economies, as the contact rate is high enough, disease endemic
steady state exists.11
10Note that there is also disease free steady state (not shown in the figure).
11Note that there is also disease free steady state (not shown in the figure).
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6 Public Policy
We study the dynamic Pigovian taxes that will decentralize the efficient competitive equilibrium.
Even though there are two externalities: the disease externality and the pollution externality we
need four taxes and subsidies to decentralize the efficient outcome. The reason is that these the
externalities affect the economy in a complex way: pollution not only affects the contact rate,
as the private abatement is not at the efficient level, but also through the change in labor supply
through disease incidence the marginal product of labor. Thus, there are two wedges introduced by
the pollution externality. The disease externality affects the private health expenditures. A fourth
tax is needed to meet the balanced budget or self-financing nature of the tax-subsidy policy.
Thus, we introduce tax policies - capital income tax τk and labor income tax τl , and subsidies
- health expenditure subsidy τh and pollution abatement subsidy τq. The decentralized economy







k̇ = (1− τk)Rk+(1− τl)W (1− i)− c− (1− τh)h− (1− τq)q−δk− (b−d)k
i̇ = α(h,P(Ȳ ,q))Π(1− i)− γi−bi
Then, we incorporate equilibrium conditions, which is the same as those in decentralized econ-
omy. Moreover, there is a balance budget constraint:
τkRk+ τlW (1− i) = τhh+ τqq. (33)
The equilibrium in the decentralized economy with public policies is determined by the fol-
lowing equations:
k̇ = f (k,1− i)− c−h−q−δk− (b−d)k
i̇ = α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i)− γi−bi
u′(c) = λ1
λ1 = λ2α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i)
1
1− τh
λ1 = λ2α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P2( f (k,1− i),q)i(1− i)
1
1− τq
λ̇1 = λ1[ρ +δ +b−d− (1− τk) f1(k,1− i)]
λ̇2 = ρλ2 +λ1(1− τl) f2(k,1− i)+λ2[α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i+ γ +b]
Proposition 4. In the decentralized economy with public policies, there exists a disease endemic
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steady state where i∗,k∗,h∗,q∗ and c∗ are determined by:
i = 1− b+ γ
α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))
(34)
α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))
1
1− τh




(1− τk) f1(k,1− i) = ρ +δ +b−d (36)
− 1− τl
1− τh
f2(k,1− i)α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i(1− i) = ρ +α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q)) (37)
f (k,1− i) = c+h+q+δk+(b−d)k (38)
Next, we are going to show how we design tax and subsidy policies, such that the decentralized
economy can replicate the allocations from the centralized economy. If we compare equation (29)
with (35), it is easy to see that the subsidy for health expenditure τh should be equal to the subsidy
for pollution abatement τq:
τh = τq. (39)
Note that this is independent of elasticities of pollution and health expenditures on the contact
rate.
Then, by comparing equation (30) with (36), we can derive capital income tax:
τk =−
P1( f (k,1− i),q)
P2( f (k,1− i),q)
. (40)





α2(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))P1( f (k,1− i),q) f2(k,1− i)i−α(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))
f2(k,1− i)α1(h,P( f (k,1− i),q))i
. (41)
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The tax and subsidy policies (τk,τl,τh,τq) are determined by equation (33), (39),
(40) and (41), where the economic variables i,k,h,q and c are the equilibrium allocations from the
centralized economy.
To understand the taxes and subsidies we do a similar exercise as in the previous section of
varying the elasticity of pollution, the elasticity of abatement and the TFP. Interestingly, for each
of the exercises, the subsidy on health and abatement decrease and the primary mechanisms are
the direct taxes on labor and capital income. The effect of increasing elasticity of pollution and
contact rate and on abatement rate is different. As elasticity of pollution on contact rate increases,
the capital income is taxed at a higher rate and labor income at a lower rate. However, when
elasticity of abatement increases, i.e. abatement is more effective, capital income is taxed at a
lower rate but to maintain budget balance, labor income taxes are increased. As TFP increases,
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Figure 5. Tax and subsidy policies - varying the elasticity of pollution on contact rate
Note: The figure shows changes in tax and subsidy policies when we change the elasticity of pollution on contact
rate.
Figure 6. Tax and subsidy policies - varying the elasticity of abatement on pollution
Note: The figure shows changes in tax and subsidy policies when we change the elasticity of abatement on
pollution
in a similar way, capital income is taxed is taxed less and to compensate labor income taxes are
increased. Thus, we should expect a different mix of labor-capital income taxes for economies
depending on their TFPs and thus, growth rates.
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Figure 7. Tax and subsidy policies - varying productivity
Note: The figure shows changes in tax and subsidy policies when we change productivity in the production
function.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the interaction of pollution with transmission of diseases. In a decentralized
economy there is the pollution externality and a disease transmission externality. As one would
expect, the level of abatement of pollution and preventive health expenditures are lower than the
centralized situation where the externalities are internalized. While the centralized outcomes can
be decentralized through dynamic Pigovian taxes, with higher productivity the level of pollution in
fact goes up in the efficient outcome. The control of the disease interacts with higher productivity,
and even though more is spent on abatement, the net effect is that pollution goes up. This is
consistent with the recent evidence where during lockdown as mobility and activity declined, so
did pollution levels. However, this was temporary and since then pollution levels have gone up
(Kumari and Toshniwal (2020)). Thus, expectation of a Green Recovery may be illusory.
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